

INTERNAL O/NE ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 May 1960

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Relations and the Summit

1. The USSR's progress towards the Summit has provoked, in Peiping's 15 April Red Flag criticisms,* the bitterest and most fundamental Chinese Communist disagreement with Soviet policy yet evidenced. Coming atop months of increasing Chinese Communist discontent, the article's point-by-point refutation of recent Soviet views indicates that the Sino-Soviet partnership is in disarray on the eve of the Summit, with the two partners championing widely divergent worldviews and proposed strategies. We consider that these divergences are almost certainly genuine, not deception, and that they have considerable significance both for the Summit and for the future of the Sino-Soviet partnership.

*"Long Live Leninism," published by the editorial department of this key CCP journal on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

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2. The Chinese article is a landmark in Sino-Soviet relations. Stated differences are not confined to tactics; now, for the first time, they explicitly include fundamental matters of Communist doctrine. The Chinese claim that they are today's only true Leninists and that Lenin's doctrines on war, revolution, and imperialism remain "irrefutable truths." By comparison, say the Chinese, the Soviets are opportunistic backsliders from Leninism who (a) are misreading the world situation by underestimating Bloc power and believing that new weaponry has made coexistence a necessity, (b) are permitting themselves to be hoodwinked by the West, and (c) are apparently ready to enter into agreements with the West which may involve concessions on fundamental matters of Communist principle. Whether such questions "are viewed and handled correctly or incorrectly," says the article, "has a close bearing on the success or failure of the proletarian cause and the destiny of world humanity." That the Soviets consider this article a frontal attack on the ideological bases of Khrushchev's present policies is indicated by the fact that Kuusinen answered the Chinese criticisms in his speech of 22 April, invoking Lenin's authority in justifying the USSR's present coexistence and Summitry policies.

3. Significance for the Summit:

a. How far are the Soviets prepared to go in making concessions to the West? The Red Flag article is especially notable for the degree of unease it displays that the Soviets, in the interests of coexistence, may be prepared to make some kind of concession to the West which would hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in the underdeveloped areas. To a lesser degree, the article also expresses caution concerning arms control negotiations. The Chinese thus appear to anticipate a Soviet willingness to make greater concessions to the West than Western observers have believed probable. Does this mean only that the Chinese are ignorant of, or misread, Soviet Summit intentions? Or is it possible that the West has been underestimating the USSR's readiness to bargain?

b. The Chinese Communists are now on record that they will not necessarily be bound by any Soviet Summit commitments. This seems clear, and especially so with respect to disarmament, support of Communist armed liberation movements, and the "liberation" of Taiwan.

c. Will the Summit be upset or Khrushchev's Summit freedom of action . . . constricted by disruptive Chinese Communist

action? It is possible that the Chinese Communists may take or sponsor extreme action of some sort in the Taiwan Strait, Laos, or South Vietnam. However, although this will hear close watching, we have no firm indications of any such action and believe it unlikely, for the near future at least. Aside from extreme action, there is little the Chinese can in fact do to vent their discontent at the USSR other than pen more frustrated polemics. Khrushchev has been fairly cavalier to date toward Chinese Communist interest or participation in the Summit, and we doubt that he will feel constrained -- in view of the high stakes at hand with respect to the West -- to try very hard to meet Chinese criticisms or to allow Chinese discontent, in itself, to harden any of his positions at Paris.

4. Significance for the future of the Sino-Soviet relationship:

a. We, and the USSR, can probably expect a continuation, and possibly a heightening, of Chinese Communist foreign policy bellicosity. The shrill criticism of the US will continue, perhaps embarrassing Soviet seductive tactics, and the Chinese will probably also continue their line of "inevitable" war and professed relative unconcern with the hazards of nuclear war. In addition, they may well attempt to sponsor a more active level of "national liberation movements" in Laos, South Vietnam, and possibly elsewhere, and will

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almost certainly keep the Taiwan Strait issue alive.

b. Chinese Communist frustration at, and ill-will toward, the USSR will probably grow. This will be especially so to the extent that Soviet Summit moves are interpreted by the Chinese as (1) excluding them from any great power negotiations which might grow out of the Summit, (2) in any way inhibiting their acquisition and free management of a nuclear weapons capability, or (3) complicating their gaining of Taiwan.

c. Communist China may increasingly assert its ideological authority at the expense of the CPSU. Peiping already is inflating "Mao Tse-tung's ideology," and is undertaking a frenetic urban commune program -- reportedly in the interest of becoming the first Bloc state to achieve a fully Communist society. If, as we estimate, Khrushchev virtually ignores Chinese Summit displeasure, he can expect increased Chinese assertiveness that their Communist interpretations are the only true scriptural exegesis.

d. The present Sino-Soviet differences pretend substantially greater ones. We have considered, but rejected, the thesis that present Sino-Soviet differences may be just calculated, coordinated maneuvers to deceive the West into doing Summit business with the USSR. The two Communist societies, Chinese and Soviet,

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are at vastly different stages, their internal and foreign policy needs, situations, and aspirations are quite dissimilar. and there is no prospect that the near future will change this. On both the Soviet and the Chinese side, we are witnessing foreign policy behavior clearly dictated not by Bloc unity but by discrete national interests. The Chinese Communist leaders see and interpret the world in fairly crude terms, and almost certainly believe that the subtle modifications which Khrushchev has made in Leninism, in the interests of doing in the West over the long term, are dangerous, revisionist innovations. In communist party experience to date, differences have generally become quite acute by the time they are encased in official and public intra-party debates on doctrine. This has now occurred, and on matters of Communist principle, not just tactics. Moreover, present frictions will be aggravated if, as we feel probable, East-West talks lead to further frustration on the Chinese part, and further Soviet irritation at Chinese ram-bunctiousness and doctrinal pretension. We do not see anything approaching a Sino-Soviet split, but we do consider that present Sino-Soviet discord over Summitry is a catalyst which has surfaced some fundamental differences which will in all probability have some lasting, disruptive effects of future Sino-Soviet policy coordination against the West.